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participants. 1 Introduction
The Council of Ministers (CM) has traditionally considered the main decision-making
body of the European Union (EU). CM represents the national views and interests within
the EU whereas the other two bodies involved with EU legislation, namely the European
Parliament (EP) and the Commission (EC), represent EU citizens' and general EU interests
respectively. The EC's power stems from its role as the agenda-setter or the initiator of EU
legislation and its executive function. It can also create new legislation using the so-called
administrative route in trade and competiton policies.1. The EP has a legislative function
like the CM. In recent years EP has gained power and there are even some recent claims
that the expanding use of codecion procedure has signi¯cantly increased EP'r power at the
expense of CM's power (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett (2000)).
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of CM voting rules in broader context. More
speci¯cally, we analyse the internal and external impact of CM voting rules on the internal
distribution of power in CM and on inter-institutional distribution of power between the
three main decision-making bodies of the EU. Moreover, we investigate the impact of the
eastern enlargement under various voting schemes in CM. The inter-governmental nature
of CM has made the design of its internal decision-making rules a central issue that raises
passions and reforming the CM voting rules has lead to tough negotiations among the
governments in the recent past.
In academic literature, CM decision-making has inspired both a great number of applied
studies and vigorous methodological debate. Quantitative applications that evaluate CM's
internal decision-making rules are usually applying standard measures of voting power of
cooperative coalitional form games, i.e. the Banzhaf (BI) or Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) 2.
These studies that are based on so-called cooperative approach consider CM in isolation
from other EU decision-making bodies. These studies started to mushroom in the early
1990s and are mostly inspired by EU enlargements and institutional reforms in which,
indeed, CM has been the key institution.
In this paper we apply the SSI. With an exception of Greece membership in 1981
CM voting rules have been under debate in every enlargement and, in particular, CM
voting rule reform was set as pre-condition for the eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007.
Standard power indices disregard voters' preferences. There are some attempts to add
preferences in coalitional form games setup. One alternative is probabilistic. If there
are good grounds to expect that some countries are consistently more willing to accept
Commission proposals in integration-disintegration scale,say, than some other countries
that can be modelled by giving each country a di®erent acceptance rate for proposals or by
dividing member states into two groups of integrationist and anti-integrationist countries
(see Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2004), Widgren (1995) and Kirman and Widgr¶ en (1995)) for
applications. Another alternative assumes speci¯c spatial preferences. One tool for this
kind of analysis is the Shapley-Owen power index. The index is due to Owen (1972) and
1This is discussed more in dept e.g. in Baldwin, BerglÄ of, Giavazzi, and Widgr¶ en (2001)
2For examples see e.g.Widgren (1994), Laruelle and Widgr¶ en (1998), Felsenthal and Machover (2001),
Felsenthal and Machover (2004), Leech (2002), Baldwin and Widgren (2004)
1Shapley (1977) that explicitly uses spatial preferrences. For a recent application to the EU
see Passarelli and Barr (2007).
When CM's inter-action with the other two bodies is considered the inter-institutional
analysis is usually carried out using spatial voting games framework. This also involves
EU's decision-making procedures. In spatial analysis, the focus is either on inter-institutional
equilibrium analysis of the EU procedures (see e.g. Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis (1994) or
for an extensive survey in Steunenberg and Selck (2006) and references therein). 3
In sum, the above examples demonstrate that probabilistic4 cooperative approach ¯ts
to purely aprioristic intra-institutional analysis and spatial non-cooperative approach to
equilibrium analysis either at inter- or intra-institutional level. Moreover, some randomi-
sation scheme is necessary to evaluate a priori power. This implies that if one wants to
assess a priori power at inter-institutional level one needs to integrate cooperative and
non-cooperative approaches. Indeed, the most recent line of research concerning power
relations in the EU is based on the so-called uni¯ed approach, which combines cooperative
and non-cooperative approaches. The approach evaluates, especially, the distribution of
power at inter-institutional and intra-institutional level simultaneously. Here the ¯rst at-
tempt is Steunenberg, Schmidtchen, and Koboldt (1999) who de¯ne power as the expected
utility (using spatial preferences) that an actor obtains in the procedure when preferences
are randomised. More recent attempt is based on the strategic measure of power (SMP)
that was introduced in Napel and Widgr¶ en (2004) and applied in inter-institutional anal-
ysis of EU codecision in Napel and Widgr¶ en (2006). The latter is based on equilibrium
analysis of procedural spatial voting games. Power is de¯ned as an actors marginal con-
tribution to the equilibrium outcome, i.e. how big the outcome shift would result from an
actor's marginal preference shift. This gives the so-called ex-post power which is turned
into ex-ante power by randomising preferences.
In this paper, we have three research questions that apply the methods described above.
The common nominator is intra-CM decision making. The rules that we consider are
the Nice rules as in the Treaty of Nice and the rules as in the in the inter-governmental
agreement that was reached in June 2007. First, and most straightforwardly, we investigate
how di®erent intra-CM voting rules a®ect the distribution of power within CM. Here we
apply the SSI.5 Let us refer to this as the intra-CM e®ect. Here, we also assess what are the
prospects of future enlargements under considered voting rules. Here we apply standard
power measures but the issue of interest is to compare power distributions under di®erent
rules and compositions of the EU. Second, we evaluate how di®erent intra-CM voting rules
3An example of a study on inter-institutional power in spatial context is Steunenberg, Schmidtchen,
and Koboldt (1999).
4Note that more classical approach in cooperative games is axiomatic. In this paper we adopt the
probabilistic approach.
5Most studies that evaluate the distribution of power in CM apply BI which based on simpler voting
assumptions than SSI. Actually BI assumes no information on voting behaviour. An often-heard and
plausible justi¯cation for this choice is that BI ¯ts to constitutional analysis and institutional design. In
this paper, our objective is not institutional design but rather the impact of given rules. The SSI ¯t to this
better. It assumes that voters' probalities of accepting a random proposal are correlated (see subsection
2.1.
2a®ect inter-institutional balance of power in the EU. The main emphasis of the analysis
is on the relationship between CM and EP. Here we apply spatial voting analysis and the
uni¯ed approach in particular. Let us refer to this as inter-institutional e®ect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the tools that
we apply in our analysis. Section 3 ¯rst introduces intra-Council decision-making. As it
forms the core of our analysis some basic facts are needed. Section 4 describes then the
our assumptions on inter-institutional or CM-EP relations and introduces a simple model
which aim to capture the crucial aspects of the procedure. These sections also introduce the
equilibrium outcome of the model that is then used to intra-Council investigation. Section
5 deals with the results of our assessment in two parts: for intra-CM inter-institutional
analysis respectively. Finally section 6 makes some concluding remarks.
2 Evaluation Methods for CM's Internal Voting Rules
2.1 The Shapley-Shubik Index
A commonly used measure for actors' voting power is the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI)
Shapley and Shubik (1954). It can be seen as a special case of a broader concept the Shapley
value Shapley (1953) in cooperative coalitional form games. SSI is restricted to so-called
simple games that are usually used to model voting games. In simple voting games, winning
and losing coalitions have di®erent worth (usually one and zero respectively). Thus, all
winning coalitions have the same worth and all losing coalitions have the same worth.
The SSI is based on the broad idea that an actor that can break a winning coalition
into losing, or vice versa, exerts power. These actors are critical in the sense that they may
help a coalition to achieve its goals. Suppose that this help is rewarded by a price, which
ends up as power.Despite of their abstractness there is some recent evidence that power
indices are able to capture actors' power and that they can be used to predict decision
outcomes in a meaningful way (e.g. Kauppi and Widgren (2007).
More formally, let N be a set of n member states in the Council and let S ½ N denote
any coalition of member states having s members. A voting game in the Council can be
characterized by a set function v(S) taking on value 1 when a coalition S forms a quali¯ed
majority and zero otherwise. In this simple setting, the Shapley-Shubik index Ái of a




(s ¡ 1)!(n ¡ s)!
n!
[v(S) ¡ v(S r i)]; (1)
where i = 1;:::;n. The ¯rst term in the sum gives the probability of country i being in
a pivotal position in coalition S and the latter term counts those pivotal positions where
country i is able to swing a winning coalition into losing, i.e. S is winning and the removal
of i from it makes it losing.
Thus, SSI implies that the relative shares of the players' swing positions predict how
powerful they are.6
3In the classical voting power literature of institutional design, either the Banzhaf Index
is more often applied than the SSI. An often heared reasoning behind this choice stems from
behind veil of ignorance argument. The Banzhaf Index considers all possible coalitions of
actors equally likely, i.e. all coalitions have have equal weight in power calculations. This
ignores among other things actors' preferences, which can be considered as clear bene¯t in
the design of voting rules. The SSI does not assume any particular preferences either but
it gives equal weights to di®erent coalition sizes from one to n if n gives the number of
actors and, moreover, all coalitions that are of equal size, say m · n, have equal weights.
One can argue that this requires more speci¯c information than the assumptions behind
the Banzhaf Index. However, the SSI has a very close link to strategic aspects of power
(see the next subsection below), which can be seen as its strength.
2.2 The Strategic Measure of Power
When there are more than one decision making institutions involved or when one is inves-
tigating the interaction between several institutions classical power index approach faces
problems as it assumes that players are voting or moving simultaneously, which is rarely the
case in decision making procedures. As mentioned above, the non-cooperative approach
serves as an alternative for investigating decision-making institutions. In the literature, the
criticism towards the co-operative approach is two-fold. First, the cooperative approach
cannot take strategic inter-institutional or procedural aspects of EU decision-making into
account and, second, it does not explicitly consider players' preferences but rather attempt
to model voting behavior more directly for instance using axioms or acceptance probabili-
ties. The latter drawback is not, however, necessarily severe in the design of constitutional
rules. It can also be seen as a reason to support abstract cooperative approach but the
former has to be taken more seriously even in constitutional analysis.
The criticism towards classical power indices above does not mean, however, that the
core of the traditional power index approach, namely a player's marginal contribution to
the outcome, is useless. For this reason, Napel and Widgr¶ en (2004) propose to extend
above analysis from the simple coalition framework of a priori power measurement and
the very basic voting game to a more general framework. First, take a player's marginal
contribution as the best available indicator of his potential or ability to make a di®erence,
i.e. his a posteriori power. Second, if this is of normative interest or a necessity for lack of
precise data, calculate a priori power as expected a posteriori power. Expectation can be









)n¡1 = ¯i: (2)
It can be interpreted as player i0s probability of having a swing in a vulnerable coalition, i.e. in a coalition
that can be turned from winning into losing by at least one of its members. PBM, like SSI, does not sum
up to unity. Therefore to assess relative power or the distribution of power the PBM is often normalized
and then referred to as the (normalised) Banzhaf index (NBI).
4with respect to several di®erent aspects of a posteriori power such as actions, preferences,
or procedure.
In this uni¯ed approach, impact is relative to a what-if scenario or what Napel and
Widgr¶ en (2004) call the shadow outcome. The shadow outcome is the group's decision
which would have resulted if the player whose power is under consideration had chosen
di®erently than he a posteriori did, e.g. if he had stayed out of coalition S when he a
posteriori belongs to it. Assume spatial preferences. Then each player has a ideal policy
position on unit interval, say. In this paper, we assume that a unit interval represents a
policy space, i.e. the set of possible policy outcomes in one issue, and a set of mutually
independent unit intervals in several issues.
To illustrate this more in detail, let ¤ = (¸1;:::;¸n) be the collection of n players' ideal
policy positions on unit interval. In a policy space [0;1], the opportunities even for only
marginal changes of preference are manifold. A given ideal point ¸i can locally be shifted
to ¸i + h where h is an arbitrary small shift either to the left or right.






as a reasonable measure of player i's ex post power. More speci¯cally, let °;¹;¼ represent
the ideal aggregate policy positions of EC, CM and EP respectively. Due to respective
internal decision-making rules ° is the ideal policy position of the median Commissioner,¹
is the ideal ,policy position of the pivotal minister (assuming QMV) in CM and ¼ is the ideal
policy of the median MEP. Using the ex post power above we can de¯ne a corresponding




Using a suitable probability distribution of players' ideal policy positions. Napel and
Widgr¶ en (2004) refer to this index to as Strategic measure of power (SMP).
3 Internal Decision-Making Rules in CM
Let us brie°y summarise CM's decision-making procedures. CM has always applied weighted
voting unless, in some cases, when unanimous consent of member states is required. In
weighted voting, each member state is assigned with a speci¯c number of votes that has
traditionally increased logarithmically by population (see Widgren (1994)). The Treaty of
Rome weighted voting scheme in CM was practically unchanged until the Treaty of Nice
that came into force in November 2004.7 The Nice agreement introduced re-weighting
7When the UK, Denmark and Ireland entered in 1973 the original votes of the founding member states
were multiplied by 2.5 with an exception of Luxembourg whose number of votes was multiplied by 2. This
was to make the di®erence between new small member states Denmark and Ireland that are clearly bigger
than Luxembourg but smaller than Belgium or the Netherlands who had one and two votes in the original
5scheme that reallocated voting rights from the smallest to the biggest nations. The major-
ity quota has traditionally been approximately 71 per cent of votes.8 The Nice rules main-
tain this quali¯ed majority voting QMV framework, but add two extra criteria concerning
the number of yes-votes and the share of EU population they represent. Speci¯cally, the
vote threshold was increased to 73:9 percent, i.e. 255=345 votes. Moreover, acceptance of a
simple majority of Member States (14 members) and countries representing 62 percent of
the EU population are required for a proposal to pass. The second and third requirements
have, however, only a negligible e®ect on the possible winning coalitions (see e.g. Baldwin
et al. (2001) or Felsenthal and Machover (2001)). The numbers of votes and member
states' populations in EU27 are shown in Table 3.
The determination of voting weights in CM looks seemingly simple and automatic (see
3) but, in practise, it is far from that. With this respect there are three striking features.
First, new entrants' voting rights have always been negotiated as a part of their accession
treaties and, second, as the system - both before and after Nice - puts member states into
clusters all countries within one cluster having the same number of votes, the assignment of
groups to the new entrants have always been a tough question in membership negotiations.
Third striking aspect is that the current system, still in power when the ¯rst wave of
enlargement took place, has not been updated to re°ect changes in member states relative
sizes. The determination of voting weights is based on clustering of member states. France
and Germany belong to the same cluster despite their more than 20 millions di®erence in
populations and the same used to hold for the Netherlands and Belgium with their six
million population di®erence. The Nice rules devoted one more vote to the Netherlands
compared to Belgium but did not correct the population di®erence between Germany and
France. In short, eastern enlargement was used to reform the old voting scheme without
regarding the shortcomings of the system.9
To make CM voting rules more transparent the Constitutional Treaty (CT), that was
agreed inter-governmentally in June 2004, made a fundamental revision to CM voting
rules. Speci¯cally, CT made a switch from weighted voting into a dual majority system
spiced with additional requirements. In fact, CT introduced a quadric majority: A win-
ning coalition must represent at least 55 percent of EU members and 65 percent of the
EU population. Moreover, during the ¯nal negotiations two last-minute Summit compro-
mises 10 were inserted. They are the requirement of at least 15 members vote 'yes' to pass
proposals and at least four countries are required to block decisions. They both have an
impact in EU27 as 15 members is 55:6 percent of the membership but in computations the
system respectively. The new system gave 10 votes for the three biggest member states, ¯ve votes for the
medium sized the Netherlands and Belgium and two votes for Luxembourg. Among the new entrants the
UK got 10 votes, Denmark and Ireland three votes each. After the 1 May 2004 enlargement the votes of
new entrants were intrapolated on the basis of the old scheme but this transitory weighting was in use
only till 31 October 2004.
8In practise, CM usually tries to ¯nd unanimous compromises but still one can argue that bargaining
that leads to a compromise involves voting weights as member states capacities. This shadow voting
argument leads us to concentrate on QMV.
9See Kauppi and Widgren (2007) for discussion about related aspects.
10The keys in EU jargon.
6Table 1: The Council Votes in EU27 under the Treaty of Nice Rules




























United Kingdom 59651.5 29
Total 345
QMV 255
7e®ect turned out to be very small. French and Dutch referenda, however, rejected the Con-
stitutional Treaty. In 2007, it was restructured and renamed and the inter-governmental
agreement (IGA) was reached in June 2007. The agreement maintains CM voting rules as
in IGA but postpones the date when they come into force till 2014, even 2017 if at least
one member state requires that.
4 The Codecision Procedure
11
European Union's codecision procedure was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht
that came into force in late 1993. The current version of the procedure is due to the
Treaty of Amsterdam and has been used since 1999. Currently, codecision procedure is the
most important and most often used decision-making procedure in the EU. Therefore, we
illustrate inter-institutional interaction using this procedure. 12
The codecision procedure is initiated by a policy proposal of the European Commission.
Then the procedure involves up to three readings of proposed legislation by EP and CM.
First, EP can approve this proposal or replace it with an amended version of its own.
Then, CM either approves the proposal on the table or initiates a second stage of decision-
making by making amendments. This new proposal { CM's `common position' in EU
parlance { is either approved by EP or, again, amended. If in the latter case CM does
not accept EP's proposal,13 The Conciliation Committee represents the ¯nal chance to
seek a shift from the status quo. The Committee is composed of all 27 members of CM
and an equal size delegation of members of EP (MEPs). The committee is co-chaired by
an EP Vice-President and the Minister holding the Council Presidency without any ¯xed
negotiation protocol. EC's role in the committee is only to draft proposals requested by
CM and EP. If CM and EP agree on a compromise, it is submitted to CM and EP for
acceptance in a third reading in which CM and EP use their typical quali¯ed and simple
majority rules, respectively. In this paper, we adopt Napel and Widgr¶ en (2006) extensive
form game model for the procedure (see Fig. 1). The bargaining outcome that EP, CM,
and also the EC expect to result from invoking the Conciliation Committee plays a crucial
role at earlier stages of the procedure. Using backward induction it is straightforward to
conclude that it is indeed the determinant of any codecision agreement if all players act
strategically. Accepted new legislation will usually come into e®ect at some date in the
medium-term future. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that neither EP nor CM has
a pronounced preference for agreeing on a policy change a few weeks sooner rather than
later. The codecision outcome can then be identi¯ed with the policy which CM and EP
expect to agree on in Conciliation (either a new policy or the status quo, in which case a
Commission with rational expectations need not even initiate the procedure). Therefore,
11This section draws heavily on Napel and Widgr¶ en (2006)
12Another important procedure is called consultation procedure, which is an interplay between CM and
EC (see Napel and Widgren (2008) for preliminary investigation)
13The Commission { by a negative opinion on EP's proposal { can require CM to accept unanimously.
8EC: European Commission
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Figure 1: Stylized codecision game tree
our quantitative analysis of EP's and CM's in°uence on codecision outcomes can actually
be con¯ned to the Conciliation stage.
We use the symmetric Nash bargaining solution to predict the Conciliation agreement as
we see no reasons to consider either EP or CM a more impatient or skilled bargainer. Using
backward induction, the codecision outcome. For the benchmark case of a unidimensional
policy space and utility that linearly decreases with distance the symmetric Nash bargain
corresponds to agreement on the ideal point which is closer to the status quo whenever
there are gains from trade, i.e.
sign(q ¡ ¼) = sign(q ¡ ¹) =) x
¤(¼;¹) =
½
¼; ½(¼;q) · ½(¹;q)
¹; ½(¼;q) > ½(¹;q):
At the inter-institutional level we assume that CM, EP and EC14 agree on their respec-
tive bargaining positions using their respective voting rules. The European Parliament
needs to approve any Conciliation compromise by simple majority. Entering negotiations
with CM about some policy change to the right of the status quo q, some of the potential
positions of the EP delegation are such that a majority of MEPs would ¯nd it bene¯cial
to intervene and select a di®erent delegation. More concretely, denote the ordered ideal
points of all MEPs by ¼(1) · ¼(2) · ::: · ¼(785) and consider a provisional bargaining
position ¼ with q < ¼ < ¼(393). Parliamentarians with ideal points ¼(392);:::;¼(785) then
have the necessary majority and common interest to instead select some delegation with
¼ ¸ ¼(392) as EP's position for Conciliation negotiations. Similarly, parliamentarians with
14Note that a simple majority of member states or MEPs can request the Commission to make proposals
on EU legislation. Hence it does not exert gate-keeping power of not proposing legal acts that it dislikes.
9ideal points ¼(1);:::;¼(393) would block a position ¼ > ¼(393). One can hence restrict EP's
ideal point in negotiations about policies x > q to ¼ 2 [¼(392);¼(393)]. According to the
strategic bargaining model of the previous section it is the institution whose ideal point
is closer to the status quo which is determining the Conciliation agreement. With this
in mind we take the in°uence-maximizing ¼ = ¼(392) to be EP's position in negotiations
about x > q and refer to the corresponding MEP as EP's pivotal player. By analogous
reasoning, we identify EP with position ¼ = ¼(393) for policies x < q.15
One characterization of the SSI refers to actors' permutations that are equally likely.
When weighted voting in CM is assumed one cannot determine CM's pivotal player by
looking only at a ¯xed order statistic ¹(i). Rather, one needs to aggregate voting weights
of the players in the right order. Small countries, on the one hand, exert power in relatively
small coalitions (with the help of relatively big countries) and big countries, on the other
hand, exert power in relatively big coalitions containing relatively big number of small
countries. This phenomenon makes it unclear, how well the SSI and SMP correspond. One
thus ¯nds the endogenous pivotal position p which then allows to use ¹(p) as a reasonable
proxy for CM's position. Since we are assuming weighted voting in CM throughout the
paper we can let us denote this position ny ¹ for short.
5 Internal and External Impact of CM Rules
5.1 Internal E®ect on CM Distribution of Power
Let us ¯rst assess the intra-CM impact of two di®erent Council voting rules that are
relevant. We concentrate on the Nice rules that are currently in use and the IGA rules
that refer to a dual majority scheme whereby 55 per cent of membership representing 65
per cent of EU population is required to pass proposals as agreed in June 2007. According
to the inter-governmental agreement, the Nice rules are in force at least till 2014 and there
is an option to have the Nice rules in use until 2017.
Figure 2 compares the power distributions, on the one hand, between the Nice and
IGA rules an, on the other hand, between the Nice and SQR65 55 rules. The upper panel
shows the di®erences in SSIs and the lower panel in NBIs. When the CT and Nice rules
are considered (solid curves) comparison of the the upper and lower panels reveals that the
shapes of the di®erences are very similar. The di®erence between the IGA and Nice rules
follows a U-shaped pattern demonstrating that the middle-sized countries lose the most
when the Nice rules are replaced by the dual square-root rules in 2014 or 2017 Romania
being an exception. Although the shapes of IGA-Nice curves are similar there are two
signi¯cant di®erences though. First, NBI suggests that the smallest countries would gain
power under CT compared to Nice whereas SSI gives them practically zero di®erences.
Second, the magnitudes of big countries' power gains are considerably higher when SSI is
used for the evaluation. This can be explained by the underlying voting models behind the
15Conciliation does not involve the Commission. Using backwards induction argument the Commission
is, in fact, a dummy player having zero power.
10Table 2: The SSIs in the EU-27 under the Treaty of Nice rules and IGA rules, %
Country Treaty of Nice IGA
Germany 8.74 16.29

















The Czech Republic 3.40 2.32
Hungary 3.40 2.29
Bulgaria 2.81 1.99









































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: The Di®erence between Shapley-Shubik (upper panel) and Normalised Banzhaf Indices












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Shapley-Shubik and Normalised Banzhaf Indices in the EU34, di®erences between the
CT and Nice rules
15indices. SSI gives more weight to coalitions having relatively small number of members than
NBI that puts most weight to coalitions having close to n=2 voters. Since big countries
are more likely to be at pivotal position in coalitions having relatively small number of
members than the small ones SSI gives them more power.
When the SQR65 55 and Nice rules are compared (dashed curves) ¯gure 2 suggests that
the magnitude of the di®erence is much lower than in comparison between the Nice and
IGA rules. Moreover, there is no systematic pattern as in the di®erences between the Nice
and CT rules. In sum, both indices suggest that the compromise solution (SQR65 55)
would practically restore the distribution of power to the Nice distribution. The major
impact of the SQR65 55 rule is that it would signi¯cantly improve CM's ability to act.
That is often measured by the so-called passage probability which simply computes the
percentage of majority coalitions to all coalitions using the Banzhaf assumption on voting,
i.e. all coalitions are equally likely. It evaluates how often a randomly chosen coalition
is winning. Of course, the passage probability values as such are meaningless since the
proposals that are voted on are not random. However, the comparison of two passage
probability values gives meaningful information how CM's ability to act changes when the
rules are changed. In EU27, the passage probability value is 2:0 per cent. The respective
¯gures for IGA and SQR65 55 rules are 17:1 and 10:0 per cent. The IGA rules would, thus,
signi¯cantly improve decision-making e±ciency in the CM The potential drawback of the
switch from the Nice to IGA rules is, however, signi¯cant redistribution of power. That is
likely to postpone the switch till 2017 or even put the whole shift to jeopardy. On the other
hand, the shift from the Nice rules to SQR65 55 rules would also improve decision-making
e±ciency considerably without a®ecting the distribution of power as much. It is worth
noting, however, that by adopting the SQR65 55 rule instead of the IGA rule the power
gains of the biggest countries would be cut.
Figure 5 shows the SSIs and NBIs for the EU34, which is the current EU27 plus
Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia. Comparison of the
Nice and CT rules demonstrates the same pattern as before. First, the big countries are
clearly winning from the CT rules and, second, the SSI shows once again bigger di®erences
between the two rules, especially in the case of the biggest member states. Although the
¯gures follow the same pattern the gains and losses are roughly doubled when we compare
the SSI and NBI. Which index is then more appropriate? They both give roughly the
same message but the magnitude is di®erent. The SSI puts much more weight to the
big countries and also the small country gains, which creates a true u-curve. A common
wisdom is that NBI is more appropriate for institution design as it completely disregards
preferences and takes all coalitions equally likely. In this paper, we are not interested in
institution design as such but rather the consequences and, therefore, the SSI values are the
ones that should be looked at. Moreover, the SSI, ¯rst, has non-cooperative foundations,
and therefore more reliable and, second, like Kauppi and Widgren (2007) showed the SSI
explains EU budget receipts very well. To conclude, there is a huge di®erence between the
voting rules in CM that are in the Treaty of Nice and inter-governmental agreement of
June 2007. It is not who loses and who gains, it is the magnitude.
165.2 External E®ect on Inter-Institutional Power
Let us next turn to inter-institutional relationship between the main decision-making bodies
of the EU. There are two questions of interest here. First, what is the distribution of power
between CM and EP in codecision procedure and, second, how the procedure a®ects the
power measures and the distribution of power in CM.
The two ¯rst columns of table 5.2 show SMPs in codecision under the Nice and IGA
rules respectively. The two next columns normalise SMPs in CM. The purpose of this
normalisation is to analyse CM in isolation using strategic power approach. What one
might expect is that we get the SSI but as the two right-most columns demonstrate that is
not true. The two last columns give the relative di®erence between the SSI and normalised
SMP (NSMP) in CM. The latter can be interpreted as the probability of being pivotal
in CM given that we take stategic considerations and spatial preferences into account.
The absolute di®erences between NSMP and SSI are not big 16 but there are considerable
relative di®erences especially for small countries. The ¯gures in two last columns also
demonstrate that the relative di®erences between the SSI and NSMP di®er according to
the procedure and the size of the country. Under the Nice rules, NSMP tends to give higher
¯gures to the biggest nations whereas the reverse holds for the IGA rules. In both cases
the relationship is monotonic: the bigger a country is the more NSMP exceeds SSI under
the Nice rules and the more it falls below under the IGA rules.
Let us next turn to assess claims that the gradual extension of the codecision procedure
to more of the EU's policy areas has moved EU decision making towards a balanced bi-
cameral system. The codecision procedure is clearly that of the EU's legislative procedures
in which EP's in°uence is greatest. Still, it is very small. The last two rows of two ¯rst
columns demonstrate that the arguments that EP and CM are equal co-deciders are simply
wrong. Under the Nice rules EP is almost powerless and under the IGA rules, despite of
relatively large gain compared to the Nice rules, still much less powerful than CM. The
use of QMV gives an advantage to CM since it is much more di±cult to get acceptance
from CM than from EP that applies simple majority. Noteworthy, however, EP is more
powerful than any single member state under the IGA rules, which is not the case under
the Nice rules. Also, the comparison of EP's ¯gures demonstrate that EP obtains consid-
erable power gains from IGA rules compared to the Nice rules. But this does not mean
that codecision works like a balanced bicameral system. If this is the goal the internal
decision-making rules, i.e. the majority quotas, in EP and CM should be approximately
the same.
It is worth noting that the SMPs do not sum up to unity. The overall sum is 0:55 under
the Nice rules and 0:69 under the IGA rules respectively. The di®erence between one and
the sum of SMPs can be interpreted as a measure of status quo bias. Note that the SMP,
like the SSI, measure constructive power. In the case of SSI, status quo bias is ruled out.17
In SMP context, a su±cient condition to this is to ¯x the status quo to 0 when unit interval
describes the policy space. In the computations of table 5.2, the status quo is, however,
16Note that the SSI values are not given here. They are shown in table 5.1 above
17In axiomatic approach, the e±ciency axiom guarantees that.
17Table 3: Strategic power in the EU27 under the Nice and Constitutional Treaty rules and
the intra-CM di®erence to SSI in codecision procedure
Member state SMP SMP NSMP NSMP (NSMP - SSI)/ NSMP - SSI)/
Nice IGA Nice IGA SSI, % SSI, %
Nice IGA
Belgium 0.0181 0.0129 0.0345 0.0232 -1.69 -0.26
Bulgaria 0.0151 0.0104 0.0287 0.0187 -2.12 0.20
Czech Republic 0.0181 0.0127 0.0345 0.02282 -1.69 -0.22
Denmark 0.0105 0.0084 0.0200 0.0150 -2.67 0.80
Germany 0.0448 0.0888 0.0852 0.1589 2.45 -0.23
Estonia 0.0059 0.0048 0.0113 0.0086 -3.31 3.88
Greece 0.0181 0.0135 0.0345 0.0242 -1.69 -0.31
Spain 0.0415 0.0426 0.0788 0.0763 1.64 -0.28
France 0.0448 0.0635 0.0851 0.1136 2.33 -0.40
Ireland 0.0105 0.0073 0.0200 0.0131 -2.67 1.37
Italy 0.0447 0.0589 0.0850 0.1054 2.20 -0.53
Cyprus 0.0059 0.0043 0.0113 0.0077 -3.31 4.78
Latvia 0.0059 0.0056 0.0113 0.0101 -3.31 2.82
Lithuania 0.0105 0.0066 0.0200 0.0118 -2.67 1.90
Luxembourg 0.0059 0.0040 0.0113 0.0072 -3.38 5.27
Hungary 0.0181 0.0126 0.0345 0.0225 -1.69 -0.18
Malta 0.0044 0.0039 0.0084 0.0071 -4.01 5.37
Netherlands 0.0196 0.0183 0.0373 0.0327 -1.59 -0.77
Austria 0.0151 0.0109 0.0287 0.0196 -2.12 0.12
Poland 0.0414 0.0374 0.0787 0.0669 1.46 -0.08
Portugal 0.0181 0.0130 0.0345 0.0233 -1.69 -0.28
Romania 0.0212 0.0233 0.0403 0.0417 -1.26 -0.62
Slovenia 0.0059 0.0053 0.0113 0.0096 -3.31 3.10
Slovakia 0.0105 0.0083 0.0200 0.0149 -2.67 0.82
Finland 0.0105 0.0082 0.0200 0.0147 -2.67 0.89
Sweden 0.0151 0.0116 0.0287 0.0208 -2.12 -0.04
United Kingdom 0.0447 0.0607 0.0850 0.1086 2.23 -0.48
Council aggregate 0.5265 0.5591 1.0000 1.0000 0.00 0.00
European Parliament 0.0214 0.1307 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
18randomised and it follows uniform distribution on [0;1]. This makes possible that status
quo prevails and that none of the actors exerts constructive (strategic) power.18
Let us next have a closer look at the impact of status quo bias and strategic aspects on
EP's and member states' power. Figure 6 makes a comparison between 'status quo bias
free' SSI and non-normalised SMP ¯gures. The curves in the ¯gure show the relative loss
of power that is due to strategic interaction and status quo bias, i.e. (SSI ¡ SMP)=SSI.
The ¯gure demonstrates an interesting di®erence between the Nice and IGA rules. Under
the former the relative losses are almost constant with an exception of EP that loses the
most. This is another way to express the result of Napel and Widgr¶ en (2006): higher
quota clearly bene¯ts CM when strategic aspects and the possibility of status quo bias are
considered.
The picture is completely di®erent in codecision procedure. A common feature is that
EP loses the most but otherwise the losses decrease monotonically in the size of the country.
The smallest countries even gain when strategic aspects and strategic aspects are taken
into account. Note that the status quo bias is smaller under IGA rules and under the
Nice rules. That also gives the intuition why small countries gain or lose less than the big
countries. Because it is mainly the big countries that are able to exert destructive power,
i.e. to block decisions, decrease in status quo bias improves small countries' position since
their overall power is based constructive, not destructive, power.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have dealt with the internal and external impact of voting rules in the EU
Council. The results of the paper demonstrate that voting rules matter. Even in simple
non-strategic environment small changes in voting rules may have unexpected implications
on the distribution of power among the actors. Dual majority rules, like the IGA rules,
are especially challenging since membership and population criteria that form the base of
such rules give less a priori advice than voting weights for expected consequences.
The design of CM voting rules become even more crucial when they are evaluated
in strategic inter-institutional environment. As the paper shows CM voting rules have
considerable impact on EP's power and capability to in°uence policy outcomes. In sum,
one of the main lessons of the analysis is clearly to explain why the design of Council voting
rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations.
18Napel and Widgr¶ en (2006) simulate the impact of CM's majority threshold on EP's and CM's SMP.
They ¯nd that EP's SMP decreases monotonically whereas CM's SMP follows an inversely U-shaped
pattern with respect to its majority quota. Hence, CM faces a trade-o® in terms of its own majority
quota. There is a majority quota (roughly 65 per cent in EU27) that maximises its SMP. Lower quotas
than that give EP more advantageous position and at higher quotas status quo bias has a negative impact























































































































































































































Figure 6: Relative losses of power due to the status quo bias and strategic interaction
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